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PROBLEMS IN THIRD-PARTY ACTION
PROCEDURE UNDER THE WISCONSIN
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT-
AN UPDATE
DONALD H. PIPER*
DAVID M. VIcrOR**
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin
Worker's Compensation Act was published in 1976.1 Since then, the arti-
cle has been cited by Wisconsin appellate courts a number of times.2
Over the years, additional questions have developed.
This article updates the 1976 article.3 Areas addressed include the
tort focus of section 102.29(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes,4 joinder issues,
and the nature and effect of notice as a condition precedent to third-
party recovery. Additionally, the questions of who controls the third-
party claim, what portion of any settlement is subject to section
102.29(1) distribution, and whether there are any limits on that distribu-
tion are analyzed. This article identifies and either resolves or offers rea-
sonable solutions for some of the ongoing problem areas associated with
third-party procedure under the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act.
* Attorney Piper, a 1972 graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, is
a partner with the law firm of Fellows, Piper & Schmidt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The focus of
his practice is litigation in general and insurance law in particular.
** Attorney Victor, a 1983 graduate of Vanderbilt University Law School, is a senior trial
attorney with CNA Insurance Companies, Brookfield, Wisconsin. The focus of his practice is
insurance litigation.
1. Donald H. Piper, Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin
Worker's Compensation Act, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 91 (1976).
2. Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. Sch., 83 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 266 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1978); Lu-
povici v. Hunzinger Construction Co., 79 Wis. 2d 491,496 n.5, 255 N.W.2d 590,592 n.5 (1977);
Laffin v. Chem. Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 359 n.5, 253 N.W.2d 51, 53 n.5 (1977); Elliott v.
Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 410, 415-16, 500 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 1993);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 131 Wis. 2d 540, 543 n.1, 388 N.W.2d 658,
659 n.1 (Ct. App. 1986); Guyette v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Wis. 2d 496,503,307 N.W.2d
311, 314 (Ct. App. 1981).
3. The authors are grateful to Margaret E. Ebner, associate attorney at Fellows, Piper &
Schmidt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for her research assistance in preparing this article.
4. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1991-92).
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II. Tim TORT Focus OF SECTION 102.29(1)
Section 102.29(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes permits employees, em-
ployers, and compensation insurers to pursue lawsuits against third par-
ties.5 However, by the plain language of that section, that permission is
limited to an action in tort. That section states in pertinent part:
The making of a claim for compensation against an employer
or compensation insurer for the injury or death of an employe
shall not affect the right of the employe, the employe's personal
representative, or other person entitled to bring action, to make
claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such
injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd party .... I
Recent court decisions have affirmed the understanding that the au-
thority granted by section 102.29(1) is limited to actions "in tort." In
particular, in Berna-Mork v. Jones,7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that a worker's compensation insurer was not entitled to subrogation
against an uninsured motorist insurer because the insured's right to re-
covery was based on contract, not tort. In so holding, the court noted:
The language of sec. 102.29(1), Stats., is clear and unambigu-
ous. The statute provides that, "[t]he employer or compensation
insurer... shall have the same right to make a claim or maintain
an action in tort against any other party.... ." (Emphasis added.)
The statutory language clearly and unambiguously sets forth that
the subrogation rights of the employer or compensation insurer
are limited to claims in tort. Claims based on contract are not
permitted.8
Additionally, in a recent court of appeals decision, Smith v. Long,9 the
court stated:
Section 102.29, Stats., reflects the legislature's intent to give a
worker's compensation carrier a right to reimbursement in spe-
cific, limited types of third-party actions, namely actions in tort
for the injury or death of the employee. The Smiths' legal mal-
practice action does not fall into this category.10
5. Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1991-92) is entitled: "Third Party Liability."
6. Id. § 102.29(1) (emphasis added).
7. 174 Wis. 2d 645, 498 N.W.2d 221 (1993).
8. Id. at 651, 498 N.W.2d at 223 (alteration in original).
9. 178 Wis. 2d 797, 505 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1993).
10. Id. at 806, 505 N.W.2d at 433.
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IlI. WISCONSIN STATUTES SECTION 803.03: DOES IT APPLY?
Section 803.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes addresses "Joinder of per-
sons needed for just and complete adjudication."'" Does this section re-
quire joinder of a worker's compensation insurer or of an employer in an
employee's third-party personal injury action? The following subsec-
tions address this question.
A. Section 803.03(1) Focus
Section 803.03(1) states as follows:
PERSONS To BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. A person who is sub-
ject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if:
(a) In the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties; or
(b) The person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may:
1. As a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability
to protect that interest; or
2. Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a sub-
stantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsis-
tent obligations by reason of his or her claimed interest.' 2
Section 102.29(1) also deals with joinder. This section states, in perti-
nent part:
If notice is given as provided in this subsection, the liability of
the tort-feasor shall be determined as to all parties having a right
to make claim, and irrespective of whether or not all parties join in
prosecuting such claim, the proceeds of such claim shall be di-
vided as follows .... 13
Accordingly, a worker's compensation insurer or an employer is able to
share in the recovery of a third-party personal injury suit without being
joined as a party. As such, the joinder requirements of section 803.03(1)
do not, at first blush, appear to come into play.
Nonetheless, an argument could be made that failure to join may, in
certain situations, impair or impede the ability of the worker's compen-
sation insurer or the employer to protect its recovery interest. For exam-
ple, in a settlement involving both an employee-claimant and the
employee's spouse, who asserts a loss of society and companionship
11. Ms. STAT. § 803.03 (1991-92).
12. Id. § 803.03(1).
13. Id. § 102.29(1) (emphasis added).
1994]
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claim, possible distribution problems may arise by reason of the fact that
the spouse's claim is not subject to section 102.29 distribution.14 In this
example, the employee, assuming a marital relationship that seeks to fos-
ter combined family assets, will attempt to maximize the spouse's share
of any total recovery in an effort to minimize the amount the insurer or
employer would receive from the total settlement. If earlier joined as a
party, a worker's compensation insurer or an employer would be better
able to, as a practical matter, protect its ability to argue what part of an
overall settlement should be fairly assigned to the employee's claim
(which is subject to distribution) as opposed to the spouse's claim (which
is not).
By reason of the foregoing, joinder under section 803.03(1) may be
appropriate and required whenever the third-party action involves both
employee and nonemployee claimants or plaintiffs. Since no Wisconsin
appellate court has specifically ruled on this issue, however, the question
of whether section 803.03(1) requires joinder in these cases remains
open for debate. Judicial or legislative guidance is needed.
B. Section 803.03(2) Focus
Section 803.03(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes states as follows:
CLAIMS ARISING BY SUBROGATION, DERIVATION AND ASSIGN-
MENT. (a) Joinder of related claims. A party asserting a claim for
affirmative relief shall join as parties to the action all persons who
at the commencement of the action have claims based upon sub-
rogation to the rights of the party asserting the principal claim, der-
ivation from the principal claim, or assignment of part of the
principal claim. For purposes of this section, a person's right to
recover for loss of consortium shall be deemed a derivative right.
Any public assistance recipient or any estate of such a recipient
asserting a claim against a 3rd party for which the public assist-
ance provider has a right, of subrogation or assignment under
s.49.65(2) or (3) shall join the provider as a party to the claim.
Any party asserting a claim based upon subrogation to part of the
claim of another, derivation from the rights or claim of another,
or assignment of part of the rights or claim of another shall join as
14. See DeMeulenaere v. Transport Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 322, 342 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App.
1983), wherein the court stated:
Because a spouse's claim for loss of consortium is a separate cause of action which does
not belong to the other spouse, we hold that a claim for loss of consortium is not in-
cluded in the term, "claim," as used in sec. 102.29(1), Stats.; and, therefore, is not sub-
ject to the sec. 102.29(1) distribution formula.
Il at 328, 342 N.W.2d at 59; see also discussion infra part VI.
[Vol. 77:489
THIRD-PARTY ACTION PROCEDURE
a party to the action the person to whose rights the party is subro-
gated, from whose claim the party derives his or her rights or
claim, or by whose assignment the party acquired his or her rights
or claim.'
Is the section 102.29 recovery right of a worker's compensation insurer
or an employer one that is created by subrogation, derivation, or assign-
ment such that it would fall within the scope of section 803.03(2)(a), and
thereby require the joinder of the compensation insurer or employer in
any third-party tort action brought by the employee? Recent court deci-
sions appear to have addressed this question with finality.
In Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance,'6 the court of appeals held that participation in a third-party action
is not a prerequisite to sharing in the proceeds of any recovery.' 7 In
making that determination, the court supported its view in a footnote
that addressed the issue of whether a section 102.29 claim is considered
to be akin to a claim based on subrogation, derivation, or assignment
within the meaning of section 803.03(2):
Appellants also argue that Employers Mutual may not state
causes of action on behalf of the employees without written as-
signments or other evidence that it acquired their causes of ac-
tion. Again, sec. 102.29(1), Stats., imposes no such requirement.
The statutory notice "is the only condition precedent to participa-
tion in the distribution" of the proceeds of the action.'8
They also advance the argument that the joinder provisions of
sec. 803.03, Stats., provide the sole means by which Employers
Mutual can "name the employee[s] ... as involuntary plaintiffs or
defendants." The argument is not clearly stated, but we note that
the title to sec. 803.03(2) indicates that it deals with "CLAIMS
ARISING BY SUBROGATION, DERIVATION OR ASSIGN-
MENT" and allows only limited joinder of parties.
While the insurer's action under sec. 102.29(1), Stats., is deriv-
ative in the literal sense of the term, it is not derivative within the
meaning of sec. 803.03(2) in that it is not based on common-law
or contractual theories of subrogation. The injured employees
are "entitled to share in the recovery ... regardless of joinder."'19
15. Wis. STAT. § 803.03(2)(a) (1991-92) (emphasis added).
16. 131 Wis. 2d 540, 388 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1986).
17. Id. at 543-44, 388 N.W.2d at 659-60.
18. This quote originated in Piper, supra note 1, at 98, and was also used in Guyette v.
West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Wis. 2d 496, 503, 307 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Ct. App. 1981).
19. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 2d at 543 n.1, 388 N.W.2d at 659 n.1 (quoting
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Icke, 225 Wis. 304, 309, 274 N.W. 283, 285 (1937)).
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Accordingly, a section 102.29 action is not an action created by subroga-
tion, derivation, or assignment, so as to require joinder under section
803.03(2). Later authority reinforces this conclusion.
In Campion v. Montgomery Elevator Company,20 the court of ap-
peals held that rights granted by section 102.29(1) are distinct from sub-
rogation, such that joinder, by reason of claims arising out of
subrogation, derivation, or assignment, is not required.2' In particular,
the Campion court based its decision on the fact that section 102.29(1)
does not mention the word "subrogation." Moreover, the court noted
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that the Worker's
Compensation Act is wholly statutory and is, in this regard, a legisla-
tively created substitute for common law.23 As such, the recovery rights
of the compensation insurer and employer under section 102.29 are
given to them by statute, not by operation of any common law doctrines
such as subrogation, derivation, or assignment.24 In addition, the Cam-
pion court noted that section 803.03(2)(b) provides options for the par-
ties after joinder.25 These options are different from those provided in
section 102.29(1).26 This distinction further supported the court's deci-
sion that Section 803.03(2) does not apply to a worker's compensation
recovery action.
IV. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 102.29(1)
"Notice" is required in order to invoke the distribution formula of
section 102.29(1). In this regard, section 102.29(1) provides in pertinent
part:
The employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid or is
obligated to pay a lawful claim under this chapter shall have the
same right to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any
other party for such injury or death.... However, each shall give
to the other reasonable notice and opportunity to join in the mak-
ing of such claim or the instituting of an action and to be repre-
sented by counsel. If a party entitled to notice cannot be found,
the department shall become the agent of such party for the giv-
20. 172 Wis. 2d 405, 493 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1992).
21. Id. at 412-13, 493 N.W.2d at 247.
22. Id. at 414, 493 N.W.2d at 248.
23. Id. See also Leonard v. Dusek, 184 Wis. 2d 267, 274, 516 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App.
1994).
24. Campion, 172 Wis. 2d at 414,493 N.W.2d at 248. The court in Campion went so far as
to describe the rights under section 102.29(1) as an "independent cause of action." Id.
25. Id. at 413, 493 N.W.2d at 248.
26. Id.
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ing of a notice as required in this subsection and the notice, when
given to the department, shall include an affidavit setting forth
the facts, including the steps taken to locate such party. Each
shall have an equal voice in the prosecution of said claim, and
any disputes arising shall be passed upon by the court before
whom the case is pending, and if no action is pending, then by a
court of record or by the department. If notice is given as pro-
vided in this subsection, the liability of the tort-feasor shall be
determined as to all parties having a right to make claim, and
irrespective of whether or not all parties join in prosecuting such
claim, the proceeds of such claim shall be divided as follows .... A
settlement of any 3rd party claim shall be void unless said settle-
ment and the distribution of the proceeds thereof is approved by
the court before whom the action is pending and if no action is
pending, then by a court of record or by the department.2 7
Unfortunately, neither section 102.29(1) nor subsequent interpretive
case authority provides much guidance as to what kind of notice is suffi-
cient, when notice must be given, and what the effect is of a failure to
give notice.
Early cases dealing with the notice requirements were not very spe-
cific as to what was considered adequate notice. Nonetheless, arguably
those cases provide some guidance. In this regard, Wolff v. Sisters of St.
Francis of the Holy Cross28 suggests that the notice must be in writing.
In Wolff, Liberty Mutual was both the worker's compensation insurer
and auto liability insurer of the employer. At issue was section
102.29(4),29 and whether the notice required under that section was
given. Although the court considered a section other than section
102.29(1), its comments are arguably applicable. Just as the court re-
jected an alleged telephone call as substantial compliance with the notice
requirement of section 102.29(4), so too, arguably, would it reject a simi-
lar verbal notice under section 102.29(1).3o
27. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1991-92) (emphasis added).
28. 41 Wis. 2d 594, 164 N.W.2d 501 (1969).
29. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(4) (1991-92) states as follows:
If the employer and the 3rd party are insured by the same insurer, or by the insurers
who are under common control, the employer's insurer shall promptly notify the par-
ties in interest and the department. If the employer has assumed the liability of the 3rd
party, it shall give similar notice, in default of which any settlement with an injured
employe or beneficiary is void. This subsection does not prevent the employer or com-
pensation insurer from sharing in the proceeds of any 3rd party claim or action, as set
forth in sub.(1).
30. See Wolff, 41 Wis. 2d at 599, 164 N.W.2d at 504.
1994]
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Holmgren v. Strebigj' also offers some guidance with regard to what
notice is sufficient under section 102.29(1). In this case, the court
adopted, via dicta, the idea that "substantial compliance" with section
102.29(1) would satisfy that section's "reasonable notice" requirement.32
The court of appeals, in Guyette v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Com-
pany33 amplified, to some extent, what type of written notice is appropri-
ate. In Guyette, the court noted that because West Bend Mutual
Insurance Company served "formal notice of its claim for reimburse-
ment under sec. 102.29, Stats.," participation in the suit was not neces-
sary. 4 Unfortunately, the Guyette court did not recite the wording of
the involved "formal notice."
More recently in Elliott v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company,35
the court of appeals considered the question of notice, holding that re-
ciprocal notice was not required under section 102.29(1).36 In addition,
the court stated that if the employee names the worker's compensation
insurer in the third-party action against the tort-feasor, the worker's
compensation insurer is not required to do anything prior to receiving
statutory distribution. For example, that named insurer need not notify
the injured party of whether it plans to participate in the action. 7 In
response to the injured party's motion to exclude that insurer from re-
covery because of its nonparticipation in the suit, the court further ruled
that the worker's compensation insurer did not need to answer the com-
plaint. This decision was based on the legal conclusion that participation
is not a required prerequisite to recovery.38 Moreover, the Elliott court
held that the burden lies with the party initiating the claim or action to
provide the statutory notice.39 In so ruling, the court further stated that
the worker's compensation insurer holds an unconditional right to the
statutory distribution, as long as the notice prerequisite is fulfilled.40
31. 54 Wis. 2d 590, 196 N.W.2d 655 (1972).
32. Id. at 599, 196 N.W.2d at 660.
33. 102 Wis. 2d 496, 307 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1981).
34. Id. at 504, 307 N.W.2d at 315; see also Gerth v. American Star Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d
1000, 1012, 480 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Guyette with approval).
35. 176 Wis. 2d 410, 500 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1993).
36. Id. at 416, 500 N.W.2d at 400.
37. Id. at 415, 500 N.W.2d at 400.
38. Id. at 415, 500 N.W.2d at 399-400.
39. Id. at 416, 500 N.W.2d at 400.
40. Id. at 415-16, 500 N.W.2d at 400. In so stating, the court cited the 1976 article that is
the subject of this update. The court stated that its view is shared by a commentator in the
area: "In the [commentator's] opinion, the lack of timely notice relates entirely to the question
of selection of counsel and control of the litigation-not the right to receive distribution under
[Vol. 77:489
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The cases discussed above offer no clear guidelines on what is consid-
ered sufficient notice. Nonetheless, written notice signed by an author-
ized representative that sets forth the current amount to be reimbursed
should be sufficient. That written notice can be stated in a letter or a
pleading. These authors suggest the following notice language be used
whenever a matter is in suit:
ABC Insurance Company (or employer) appears by its under-
signed counsel and hereby gives notice to the court and all coun-
sel that it has become obligated to pay and has paid medical and/
or disability benefits to or on behalf of (employee's name), in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Chapter 102 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, and may continue to do so in the future. In particular,
the following amounts have been paid to date: medical ex-
penses-$_ and disability benefits-$- . By virtue of
such payments and the provisions of section 102.29(1) of the Wis-
consin Statutes, ABC Insurance Company (or employer) hereby
gives notice of its right to be reimbursed, pursuant to that statute,
out of any payment of proceeds to the (employee's name) as a
result of the summons and complaint in the above-captioned mat-
ter, whether such payments arise from judgment, settlement, or
otherwise. ABC Insurance Company (or employer) further re-
quests that the court adjudicate and protect its rights under sec-
tion 102.29(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes, to the extent necessary
and applicable.
This language would be sufficient to advise the court and all litigants of
the worker's compensation insurer's right or the employer's right to
share in any recovery proceeds, pursuant to the provisions of section
102.29(1). As noted, there is no specifically prescribed requirement as to
the content or the form such notice must embody. Rather, what is im-
portant is that some form of written notice-whether by pleading or let-
ter-be served upon all parties and the court so that the statutory rights
of the worker's compensation insurer or employer are enforced and
protected.4'
With respect to the question of when notice must be given, the court
of appeals in Employers Mutual Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual
section 102.29(1)." Id. at 416,500 N.W.2d at 400 (quoting Piper, supra note 1, at 104 (footnote
omitted)).
41. See Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1991-92), which states: A settlement of any 3rd party
claim shall be void unless said settlement and the distribution of the proceeds thereof is ap-
proved by the court before whom the action is pending and if no action is pending, then by a
court of record or by the department.
1994]
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Insurance Company42 provides some guidance. The court indicated that
once the claim had been initiated by one party, notice "prior to trial" is
all that is required to allow for the statutory distribution under section
102.29(1). 4' Moreover, the court held that such notice did not have to be
provided prior to the running of any statute of limitations.44
Finally, while section 102.29(1) requires notice, there is little gui-
dance as to the effect of a failure to give such notice.45 By the express
terms of section 102.29(1), when the requisite notice is timely given, the
entire cause of action against the third party is considered and resolved.
The unstated inference of that statement is that if such notice is not
given, the entire cause of action will not be resolved. This suggests that
the party who was not given notice has a continuing claim and can seek
to void the settlement pursuant to the last sentence of section102.29(l). 46
Because the third party is interested in resolving the entire cause of
action in one proceeding, that third party should always make sure that
adequate notice has been given. Also, because the joint prosecution
procedure and distribution formula specified in section 102.29(1) will
usually be most advantageous to the worker's compensation insurer or
employer, those parties should be sure to give the requisite notice as
soon as they are able.
As noted above, the notice requirement of section 102.29(1) raises
many questions. Judicial or legislative clarification would be helpful.
V. WHO CONTROLS THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM?
A party seeking reimbursement under section 102.29(1) is entitled by
statute to "an equal voice in the prosecution of said claim."'47 Who, in
42. 131 Wis. 2d 540, 388 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1986).
43. Id. at 544, 388 N.W.2d at 660.
44. Id- at 543, 388 N.W.2d at 659.
45. The Elliott court, in dicta, provided the following statement: "Where such notice is not
given, the distribution cannot occur until such deficiency is corrected." Elliott v. Mut. Cas.
Co., 176 Wis. 2d 410, 416, 500 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 1993). Unfortunately, the Elliott
court did not elaborate further.
46. The word "void" in the statute has been interpreted to mean voidable. Lumberman's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 380, 103 N.W.2d 69 (1960).
47. See Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1991-92), which states:
The employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to pay a
lawful claim under this chapter shall have the same right to make claim or maintain an
action in tort against any other party for such injury or death.... Each shall have an
equal voice in the prosecution of said claim ....
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light of this declaration, controls the third-party claim? In particular,
who controls the terms and amount of any settlement?
In Simanek v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter,4 the court of appeals said:
The statute thus mandates the division of proceeds without re-
gard to participation in the suit. An insurer that exercises its stat-
utory right to waive prosecution of the claim cannot be penalized
for doing so by being forced to accept any settlement arranged
between the employee and the third party. The insurer has an
interest in the outcome of the settlement and must be allowed to
participate, at least to the extent of ensuring that the settlement
agreement complies with the statute.49
Unfortunately, Simanek does not specify whether this rule (allowing the
worker's compensation insurer or employer to participate in the out-
come of the settlement) extends to a right to reject both the form and
amount of the settlement, or simply the form.
In Elliott v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.50 the court of appeals
appears to have provided at least a partial answer to this question. The
court said that if the worker's compensation insurer does not actively
participate in the settlement negotiations with the tort-feasor, it waives
its right to complain about the "terms or amount of the settlement."'51
Moreover, the Elliott court said:
The statutory notice procedures assure that an interested
party who is not making the claim or instituting the action none-
theless is given an opportunity to actively join in the claim or the
action and thereby have a voice (most notably through counsel)
in all strategic decisions, including settlement. However, where
the interested party receiving notice chooses not to directly par-
ticipate in the claim or the action, such declination does not oper-
ate to defeat such party's right to the statutory share of the
distribution.52
48. 113 Wis. 2d 1, 334 N.W.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1983).
49. Id. at 5, 334 N.W.2d at 912.
50. 176 Wis. 2d 410, 500 N.W.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1993).
51. See Elliott, where the court of appeals noted that the worker's compensation carrier,
having received notice of the pending third-party action:
could have actively participated in the ensuing settlement negotiations with the
tortfeasor. It did not. Therefore [the worker's compensation insurer] could not (and
did not) complain about the terms or amount of the settlement. However, [the
worker's compensation insurer's] silence did not defeat its right to share in the settle-
ment pursuant to the statutory distribution formula.
Id. at 416, 500 N.W.2d at 400.
52. I at 415, 500 N.W.2d at 400 (emphasis added).
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In short, lack of participation in the settlement negotiations, while
negating the ability to complain about the amount of the settlement,
does not defeat the right of the worker's compensation insurer or the
employer to share in whatever settlement proceeds result from such ne-
gotiations. As Elliott and Simanek emphasize, that right remains
absolute.
Two questions arise at this point: what is meant by "equal voice" and
what degree of "participation" is required to complain about the amount
of the settlement? Unfortunately, there is no law offering a meaningful
discussion with regard to the equal voice aspect. Moreover, the law ad-
dressing the necessary level of participation is unclear, especially when
considered in the context of the scenario discussed below.
For example, assume a worker's compensation insurer or employer
appears by Counsel, files a responsive pleading, and actively participates
in all pretrial discovery and motions. Notwithstanding this participation,
the employee and tort-feasor negotiate and agree upon a settlement fig-
ure without consulting the worker's compensation insurer or employer.
The holding in Elliott suggests that such participation on the part of the
insurer or employer may give rise to a right to challenge the terms or
amount of the settlement53 negotiated exclusively by the employee and
tort-feasor. Unfortunately, a clear answer or guideline specifying what
level of participation is necessary to do so has yet to be provided.
In this regard, it should be emphasized that in Elliott, the amount of
the settlement was not in issue. Therefore, the discussion in that case as
to the ability to challenge the amount of the settlement was dicta. How-
ever, there may be cases in which a question will arise as to whether the
worker's compensation insurer or employer can challenge the settlement
amount as inappropriate. One could argue, based upon the Elliott dicta
and the "equal voice" language of section 102.29(1), that such a chal-
lenge should be resolved by a court of record.54 Further judicial or legis-
lative guidance is needed in this area.
VI. WHAT PORTION OF THE OVERALL SETTLEMENT IS SUBJECT TO
SEcTION 102.29(1) DISTRIBUTION?
The language of section 102.29(1) sets out what appears to be a sim-
ple formula for dividing the recovery proceeds among the employee, em-
53. Id.
54. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1991-92) provides, in part: "[A]ny disputes arising shall be
passed upon by the court before whom the case is pending, and if no action is pending, then by
a court of record or by the department."
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ployee's counsel, and the worker's compensation insurer or employer.55
Although many distributions are problem-free, some are problematic.
Various factors may enter into the settlement picture, raising questions
as to what portion of the total recovery must comply with the statutory
"formula." Fortunately, the courts have provided guidance in cases in-
volving several such complicating factors.
A. Structured Settlement Cases
One problem area is that of structured settlement cases in which all
or part of the settlement is paid in the form of annuities rather than a
simple "lump sum" payment by the tort-feasor. Simanek involved such a
settlement plan, devised without the consent of the worker's compensa-
tion insurer, to distribute payments to the plaintiff over a twenty-year
period.56 Under the plan, the worker's compensation insurer would be
required to wait until the eleventh year before receiving any reimburse-
ment.57 The court rejected this plan on the grounds that it would un-
fairly penalize the worker's compensation insurer by denying the insurer
the "use of its money for over 11 years."5 8 Accordingly, unless the
worker's compensation insurer or employer agree otherwise, the insurer
or employer and employee must receive payments contemporaneously.59
That is, for such a plan to comply with the statutory requirements, it
must call for each payment to be distributed under the statutory
formula.60
B. Derivative Claim Cases
Another complicating circumstance is the presence of a spouse's
claim for loss of consortium. In Kottka v. PPG Industries, Inc.,61 the
55. See id., which provides, in part:
After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, one-third of the remainder shall
in any event be paid to the injured employe or the employe's personal representative
or other person entitled to bring action. Out of the balance remaining, the employer,
insurance carrier or, if applicable, uninsured employers fund shall be reimbursed for all
payments made by it, or which it may be obligated to make in the future, under this
chapter.... Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employe or the employe's
personal representative or other person entitled to bring action.
56. Simanek v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, 113 Wis. 2d 1, 1, 334 N.W.2d 910, 910 (Ct. App.
1983).
57. Id.
58. Id at 7, 334 NAv.2d at 912.
59. Id. at 6-7, 334 N.W.2d at 912.
60. See Skirowski v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 158 Wis. 2d 242,462 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App.
1990).
61. 130 Wis. 2d 499, 388 N.W2d 160 (1986).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed this question and held that a
spouse's claim for loss of consortium is not subject to allocation under
section 102.29(1).62 The court's guideline for making this determination
appears clear and certain: the allocation formula applies "to all claims in
tort for an employe's injury or death for which the employer or its in-
surer has or may have liability. '63 The spouse's claim, although deriva-
tive of the injured employee's third-party tort claim, is a separate claim
for which the worker's compensation insurer had no prior liability under
the provisions of Chapter 102.64 Therefore, it is not subject to
distribution.65
C. Questionable Compensability Cases
A question arises as to whether the worker's compensation insurer or
employer is entitled to reimbursement under section 102.29(1) out of the
entirety of a third-party recovery in a case where that insurer or em-
ployer paid only a portion of a questionable compensation claim and
denied the remainder. The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed this
question in Nelson v. Rothering.66 The court held that even if a worker's
compensation insurer denied coverage for a portion of the plaintiff's in-
juries on the grounds that such injuries were not work related, it can still
recover in a subsequent third-party action for such injuries, provided the
compensable injuries for which benefits were paid are part of the plain-
tiff's claim for recovery against the third-party tort-feasor.67
To understand this rule, the facts in Nelson must be examined. In
Nelson, the plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury in a work-related automo-
bile accident.68 She allegedly developed gastrointestinal problems as a
result of medication prescribed for her injuries.6 9 The worker's compen-
62. Id. at 521, 388 N.W.2d at 170.
63. Id. at 514-15, 388 N.W.2d at 167.
64. Id. at 521-22, 388 N.W.2d at 170.
65. See also DeMeulenaere v. Transp. Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 322, 342 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App.
1983). As to the question of what portions are allocable out of wrongful death payments to a
surviving spouse or children, see Stolper v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 178 Wis. 2d 747,
505 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1993) (applying the Kottka rules in holding such claims subject to
distribution, with the exception of amounts apportioned for loss of consortium), rev. denied,
179 Wis. 2d clxxvii, 510 N.W.2d 138 (1993). But see Cummings v. Klawitter, 179 Wis. 2d 408,
506 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1993), rev. denied, 513 N.W.2d 405 (1993). There appears to be a
conflict of authority between the court of appeals in two different districts. Interestingly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has denied petitions to review in both cases.
66. 174 Wis. 2d 296, 496 N.W.2d 87 (1993).
67. Id. at 305, 496 N.W.2d at 91-92.
68. Id. at 299, 496 N.W.2d at 89.
69. Id.
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sation insurer paid benefits for the whiplash injury, but denied payment
for the gastrointestinal problems on the grounds they were not work re-
lated.70 In a subsequent third-party action, plaintiff argued the recovery
should be apportioned between the two different "injuries," with only
the portion for the whiplash injury being subject to section 102.29(1) dis-
tribution.71 The court rejected this argument and held that the statute
required application of the statutory formula to the entire recovery.72
VII. ARE THERE ANY LiMrrS TO SECTION 102.29(1) RECOVERY?
A different set of rules applies to section 102.29(1) cases than to com-
mon law subrogation cases. Unlike in the latter situation, section
102.29(1) recovery does not require that the plaintiff be "made whole"
before the right of the worker's compensation insurer or the right of the
employer to reimbursement arises.73 The court of appeals has rejected
the argument that a worker's compensation insurer should not recover
reimbursement out of a tort settlement far below the actual value of a
third-party claim.74 In addition, the court of appeals has rejected the
applicability of common law subrogation principles75 since these princi-
ples "do not address the Worker's Compensation Act and the disburse-
ment of funds under sec. 102.29(1), Stats. 76
Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that equitable principles apply to such cases. In Nelson, the court em-
phasized that common law rules of equitable subrogation do not apply to
third-party tort actions arising from worker's compensation claims.77
Rather, recovery in these actions is governed not by "a determination of
70. Id. at 299-300, 496 N.W.2d at 89.
71. Id. at 300, 496 N.W.2d at 89.
72. See also Smith v. Long, 178 Wis. 2d 797, 505 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
proceeds from a settlement of a legal malpractice claim-for failing to prosecute a third-party
action-not allocable, pursuant to the Kottka rule, and contrasting the differing rights in-
volved in a claim for medical malpractice arising from treatment of compensable injuries).
73. Cf. Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982);
Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977). But see Brewer v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 864, 418 N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1987). Where insurance
proceeds are insufficient to satisfy both the reimbursement claim and the surviving spouse's
claim for wrongful death, settlement must be pro-rated between allocable and non-allocable
amounts, as set forth in a formula devised by the court of appeals. Id. at 869, 418 N.W.2d at
843.
74. Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 306, 496 N.W.2d at 92.
75. See Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263,316 N.W.2d 348 (1982);
Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977).
76. Martinez v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 132 Wis. 2d 11, 14, 390 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Ct. App. 1986)
(citing Vogt v. Schroeder, 129 Wis. 2d 3, 13, 383 N.W.2d 876, 880 (1986)).
77. Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 306, 496 N.W.2d at 92.
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the equities involved but rather a mathematical application of the legis-
lative formula for apportioning the settlement proceeds. '7 8 Since the
legislature has mandated a method for apportioning recovery under such
claims, "the courts of this state are not free to select a method they
might consider to be the most equitable for allocating the proceeds of a
particular third-party settlement."7 9
It is interesting to note that the majority in Nelson agreed that their
result was, perhaps, not entirely equitable. Nonetheless, since the legisla-
ture has established a "worker's compensation scheme," setting forth a
specific method for dividing such recoveries, it is not up to the courts to
fashion a different, albeit more fair, result.8 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
Problems associated with third-party action and procedure continue
to be identified. Although some questions have been addressed by the
appellate courts, other questions, most importantly who controls the
third-party claim, remain open for debate and ultimate resolution via
legislative or judicial means.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 180, 290 N.W.2d 276, 279-80
(1980) ("It must be remembered that worker's compensation laws constitute an all-pervasive
legislative scheme which attempts to effect a compromise between the employer and the em-
ployee's competing interests.").
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